Climate and Society in Ireland is a collection of essays, commissioned by the Royal Irish Academy, that provides a multi-period, interdisciplinary perspective on one of the most important challenges currently facing humanity. In Chapter 4, Gill Plunkett (Queen’s University Belfast), David M. Brown (Queen’s University Belfast) and Graeme T. Swindles (Carleton University, Ottawa) examine ways in which we can identify the past occurrence of droughts and evaluate whether the droughts may have triggered economic responses or population collapses.

Ireland is not a location known for its droughts. Rather, its frequent rainfall is internationally infamous, and a common source of conversation and consternation across the island. Yet the atypical hot, dry summer of 2018 (lasting from June to August), while lauded by many inhabitants, brought unexpected hardship to farmers, as grass growth declined and led to a shortage of fodder, and crops risked failing due to a lack of irrigation. There were health consequences too, as larger than usual numbers of individuals presented to hospitals with severe cases of sunburn, and in at least one instance, a child was admitted with a rare skin disease that may have been aggravated by the unusual heat. All this transpired just months after the ‘Beast from the East’ saw an anticyclonic arctic airmass bring exceptional cold and heavy snow that caused considerable societal and economic disruption.

While the extreme summer of 2018 may be symptomatic of the climate crisis that currently confronts us, droughts have featured in the Irish climate in the past. Instrumental climate records are of course a relatively recent innovation; for Ireland, the longest-running continuous sequence of weather data—from Armagh Observatory—was established a little over two centuries ago, within which time the climate has emerged from the Little Ice Age and post-Industrial warming began. For an understanding of longer-term natural climate behaviour, one must turn to historical and palaeoenvironmental proxy records. An entry in the Annals of Ulster for the year AD 749 tells of ‘Snow of unusual depth so that nearly all the cattle of the whole of Ireland perished, and the world afterwards was parched by unusual drought’, extremes that are rather reminiscent of the spring and summer of 2018. The consequences of droughts for farmers can also be gleaned from earlier chronicles: for example, the Annals of Ulster records for the year AD 773 an ‘Unaccustomed drought and heat of the sun so that nearly all bread [grain] failed. Abundance of oak-mast afterwards’. These references serve as salutary reminders of the detrimental societal impacts even one dry season can trigger. What then if such conditions persisted over many years as ‘drought phases’? Palaeoenvironmental data suggest that they did.

One of the upsides of Ireland’s pervasive wet climate is that it has resulted in ample bogs whose distinctive qualities have allowed them to capture records of past environmental change as they formed and accumulated peat through the millennia. Specifically, the inhibition of biological decay has ensured the partial preservation of plant and animal remains that once lived on the bogs, communities of which were strongly influenced by the degree of bog surface wetness. In peatlands that are independent of the water table (raised and blanket bogs), bog surface wetness is at least in part governed by climate: the drier and/or warmer the conditions, the drier the bog surface, while the colder and/or wetter the condition, the higher the water level at the bog surface. While the degree of wetness is therefore a product of both temperature and precipitation, it is thought that summer effective precipitation is the leading variable reflected in palaeohydrology records. Examining changes in biotic communities preserved within the peat, linked as they are to bog surface wetness, can therefore yield indirect (proxy) records of past climate variability. During drier phases, the peat itself will undergo a greater degree of decomposition (humification), so humification levels too are an index of past conditions. Subfossilised remains of bog oaks and pines also give insights into changing hydrological conditions through the dates of their establishment and die-off. Successful germination and establishment of such trees on bog surfaces will only occur during periods of lower water tables.

Using a multi-proxy approach on peat sequences extending back to the Early Bronze Age (2500 BC), Swindles, Blundell and Roe identified three periods of potentially extended drought dating respectively to 1150–800 BC, 320 BC–AD 150 and AD 250–470, in addition to an extended period of drought in the post-Industrial era. The climate signal in the upper levels of the bogs is, however, confounded by direct human impacts on bog hydrology, such as peatland drainage. A subsequent study entailing a wider selection of sites upheld the identification of these intervals as drier phases, although Plunkett saw the first of these events as two distinct dry events, separated by a wet shift. These findings imply that extended drought phases did indeed transpire in the past.

Here we examine three time-intervals for which there has been posited evidence for droughts phases during Irish prehistory, and for which we can avail of precisely-dated data from bog oaks and pines to evaluate the evidence for and timing of these events. We consider the impacts these changes might have had on human populations, specifically from an economic perspective, and examine whether environmentally-driven interpretations stand up to critical analysis.

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Climate and Society in Ireland is a collection of essays, commissioned by the Royal Irish Academy, that provides a multi-period, interdisciplinary perspective on one of the most important challenges currently facing humanity. In Chapter 3, Phil Stastney (Museum of London Archaeology) examines the ways in which peatland archaeological and archaeo-environmental datasets have been interpreted and understood.

Peatlands cover approximately one fifth of the surface of the island of Ireland, and are well established archives of palaeoenvironmental data, preserving sensitive records of past climatic change. Irish bogs are also well-known for their internationally-important archaeology, with over 3,500 peatland structures, mostly timber trackways of various kinds (see Fig. 1), recorded in the Irish Sites and Monuments Record. Ironically, this vast archaeological record has largely been revealed by the exploitation of bogs for peat extraction, a process which threatens this resource and add surgency to the need to adequately record and understand it. Meanwhile, increasing recognition of anthropogenic climate change since the 1990s has renewed interest in human–environment interactions. Given the direct association of archaeological and palaeoenvironmental data in Irish bogs, peatland trackways present an opportunity to study in microcosm the relationship between past human activity and environmental change. As concerns about the impacts of future climate change and the loss of the Irish peatland archive grow, so too does the importance of investigating past human–environmental interactions in these unique, and ultimately irreplaceable, settings.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a review of research on past human–environmental interactions in Irish peatlands, and in particular to critically examine the ways in which peatland archaeological and palaeoenvironmental (‘archaeo-environmental’) datasets have been interpreted and understood. Following a brief overview of the literature, it becomes clear that there is no consensus on the influence of past environmental change on human activity in Irish bogs. In order to explore the reasons for this, the specific methodological challenges and theoretical considerations associated with the study of peatland archaeo-environmental datasets are then explored. A case study from a small group of bogs in Co. Tipperary is then introduced to illustrate these methodological issues and to evaluate a number of contrasting interpretive approaches, including a novel technique borrowed from the emerging field of ecocriticism. Finally, the various approaches are discussed and evaluated in relation to methodological and theoretical considerations, and the following overarching research questions are addressed:

1. What are the methodological challenges inherent in comparing the archaeological and palaeoenvironmental datasets obtained from Irish bogs?

2. What underlying theoretical assumptions underpin existing interpretations of past human–environment interactions in Irish bogs? Could theoretical developments in other disciplines offer any new insights?

3. How, armed with an understanding of the methodological challenges and recognition of underlying theoretical assumptions, could such novel insights be applied in practice?

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A ‘welfare imaginary’ is a sociological concept referring to the set of values, institutions, laws and symbols through which people imagine their social whole, but the word ‘imaginary’ can more simply refer to imagination. I like to think that the article ‘A New Welfare Imaginary for the Island of Ireland’, I have just published in Irish Studies in International Affairs: ARINS, might play a role in sparking our collective sociological imagination about how social security and related issues of poverty and inequality should inform discussion of any shared future for this island.

Responses to my paper, by Dr Charles O’Sullivan and Dr Ciara Fitzpatrick, and Prof. Fred Powell, respectively discuss challenges of collaborative work on social security in Ireland and Northern Ireland, and question the degree of overall welfare state convergence, but both agree there is enough to collaborate about. The complicated nature of social security, where the devil is in the detail, and the lack of specific Northern Irish social security data, mean we should avoid focusing learning on processes of comparative analysis that trap us in what Freud described as the ‘narcissism of small differences’. Rather, the focus should be on prospects for Ireland’s future; understanding the context and constraints within which decisions will be made and finding frameworks for developing complementary forms of income support and progressive tax systems that enable collective sustainability.

In a sense my ARINS article and responses to it can be interpreted as an act of public sociology expanding the boundaries of welfare sociology to engage with non-academic audiences. While some social security scholars in Ireland see social security policy in Northern Ireland (as opposed to the UK more generally) as mostly irrelevant to larger political economy issues in a European context, others see the potential relevance of thinking about social security across the island of Ireland. There has been historical ‘social psychological resistance’ towards joint knowledge mobilisation on the island. David Rottmann, in a 1999 review, outlined formidable obstacles to comparing problems and perspectives across the two Irelands, and an absence of advancing analysis through north/south comparison. Two decades later there is little recent cross jurisdictional work to draw from. Mary Corcoran has observed that academic all-island networks have not to date been a catalyst for comparative research.

A proposal for a new ‘all-island welfare laboratory’ explored in my article is endorsed by O’Sullivan and Fitzpatrick as having significant potential for boundary crossing, combining academic knowledge and methodology in an approach that enables a new discursive dynamic capable of generating new knowledge, norms and imaginations for welfare on the island of island. Such a north-south social security ‘laboratory of democracy’ could be informed by the work of the wider All Island Social Security Network (ASSIN), proposed by welfare state scholars in Ireland, which could identify and address gaps in data and analysis concerning social security provision north and south of the border, and create new collaborations for comparative contributions. A similar process in Scotland, even in the context of limited devolution, has successfully charted an imaginative pathway to a more social democratic or Nordic vision for the Scottish welfare state.

Ideally, such collaborations should not be between academics but between academics, NGOs, claimants’ representative groups. They should not be solely about social security but should address cross-sectoral questions in overlapping fields, including how climate change will impact on social security and how a different approach to income support might generate positive impacts for capacity to fight climate change. The AISSN should also focus on intersectional realities of poverty and inequality, women, particularly young people, and ethnic minorities including Travellers. Special effort should be made to proactively include amongst project partners those involved in social security law and welfare rights, service providers and women’s groups and to keep grounded with input and testimony from lived experience part of the ongoing process of networking.

There are many gaps in our collective knowledge, and much that could be done in ‘mobilising an ‘an island welfare imaginary’, and while there is significant potential we should be sober in judging possibilities and constraints and remain erudite and in the context of necessarily complex analysis. The potential includes identifying and mapping the common themes and ideologies that inform contemporary social security provision on the island of Ireland, building a framework for a shared vision of the social security system, hosting an all-island conference, building a website and information hubs, submitting funding applications, and discrete collaborations. We need all-island processes of knowledge mobilisation that can contribute towards an ‘island welfare imaginary’ which draws on Nordic social democratic and universal models of welfare states and seeks to maximise social and economic participation as a way of rooting solidarity and reciprocal citizenship.

Read the full article by Mary P. Murphy, ‘A new welfare imaginary for the island of Island’ as it appears in our journal Irish Studies in International Affairs: ARINS. A reply to Fred Powell and to Charles O’Sullivan, and Ciara Fitzpatrick is also available here.

Climate and Society in Ireland is a collection of essays, commissioned by the Royal Irish Academy, that provides a multi-period, interdisciplinary perspective on one of the most important challenges currently facing humanity. In Chapter 2, Meriel McClatchie (University College Dublin) and Aaron Potito (National University of Ireland Galway) review archaeological and palaeoecological evidence for environments and climate in Neolithic Ireland and consider their complex relationships with contemporary social change.

The Neolithic period in Ireland (4000–2500 BC) was a time of profound social change. When compared with the preceding Mesolithic period, Neolithic communities developed new ways of constructing their houses, burying their dead, and procuring and preparing their food. The introduction of farming into Ireland fundamentally changed how society was organised and the environments in which people lived. It is not yet clear if climatic change played a role in the initial uptake of farming during the Early Neolithic or in its decreased signal during the Middle–Later Neolithic. Recognising and understanding these changes have long been a focus of scholarship in Irish archaeology. Until relatively recently, the environmental and climatic contexts of these changes have been less well understood, in part because tracing environmental and climatic change is challenging. This issue can be addressed, however, through an interdisciplinary approach. Chapter 2 will review our understanding of environments and climate in Neolithic Ireland, drawing upon evidence from archaeology, archaeobotany, zooarchaeology, palynology, palaeolimnology, organic residues, stable isotopes and sediment geochemistry. These sources have been selected because they provide diverse datasets and theoretical perspectives; integration of these sources has the potential to facilitate more nuanced understandings of how people interacted with their environments in Neolithic Ireland, and the potential impacts of changing environments and climate. The paper will start by exploring how different data sources can be drawn upon, followed by a diachronic perspective towards examining environmental interactions and climatic change at different times during the Neolithic. The paper will discuss the implications of these data for understanding past societies, environments and climate, and concludes with an assessment of whether, and if so to what extent, social and environmental changes in Neolithic Ireland were linked.

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Climate and Society in Ireland is a collection of essays, commissioned by the Royal Irish Academy, that provides a multi-period, interdisciplinary perspective on one of the most important challenges currently facing humanity. In Chapter 1, Graeme Warren (University College Dublin) reviews evidence for the potential impact of climate change on the earliest human settlement of Ireland.

Chapter 1 explores the relationship between climate change and the timing, character and extent of the settlement of Ireland by hunter-gatherers. This includes material from two geological epochs: recently identified evidence for Upper Palaeolithic activity in the Late Glacial period of the Pleistocene, and the more substantial evidence for Mesolithic activity in the Holocene. At one level, the influence of climate change on this topic is profound: the archaeological period names are themselves products of our understanding of climate change, with the shift from the Pleistocene to Holocene at 11,700 cal BP often seen as the transition from the Upper Palaeolithic to Mesolithic. However, whilst a very broad relationship between climate change and the timing of human colonisation of Ireland by hunter-gatherers can be identified, understanding how this influenced hunter-gatherers once the island was settled is not clear. The lack of data with appropriate resolution to examine this relationship is a key problem.

Understanding the relationship between climate change and human social transformations is one of archaeology’s ‘grand challenges’, potentially allowing the discipline to make a contribution to our understanding of one of the major existential crises facing humanity in the twenty-first century. Claiming that an understanding of how climate change affected small-scale societies 10,000 years ago may help us identify strategies and possibilities for responding to the impacts of anthropogenically driven climate change on an industrialised world in the present may seem far-fetched, but understanding the varied human responses to climate change is of great significance in a world where many still deny anthropogenic climate change, or find difficulty in responding to it meaningfully due to the apparently overwhelming scale of the challenge.

It is also important to recognise that contemporary hunting and gathering communities are amongst the most vulnerable to the effects of anthropogenically driven climate change. This is not because hunting and gathering groups are less resilient in the face of change, or less able to adapt their routines. An enormous body of work has demonstrated that hunter-gatherer societies are not solely products of their environment, but are the outcome of dynamic histories of change in forms of belief and tradition as well as expressions of agency within particular environments, which in turn shape those environments. Rather, today’s hunter-gatherers are especially vulnerable because they often live in environments where the effects of climate change are more marked, such as the Arctic. For such groups, changing climates and environments are having profound effects not just on the distribution of resources, but also on the ability to sustain traditions, customs and world views. It is for this reason that climate change presents an existential challenge. Their identities are bound to the places they inhabit and formed through routines of movement and practice. Simply moving or changing their ways of life is not an easy response, as it may mean the end of their traditional cultures. On this basis, over a decade ago the Inuit Circumpolar Conference argued that because climate change was leading to a loss of identity it was an infringement of their human rights.

Understanding the impact of climate change on past hunter-gatherers therefore provides an important contribution to a key problem. Ireland should be well placed to contribute to such debates, not least because it is an island in an ecologically marginal position at the north-western extremity of Europe. Ireland’s north Atlantic position also means that it should be sensitive to changes in oceanic thermohaline circulation, often considered a key contributor to Holocene climate change. Ireland has been an island since c. 16,000 cal BP8 and this island status is associated with a limited diversity of plants and animals. This may have augmented the effects of climate change in Ireland because of the greater vulnerability of an ecosystem with fewer components. Interdisciplinary work to examine the question of the comparative ecological complexity and resilience of early Holocene Ireland is a compelling need. Thus Ireland should provide an important case study of the relationship between climate change and hunter-gatherers. Unfortunately, as will be demonstrated in this paper, notwithstanding this potential, problems of data resolution mean this cannot be realised at present.

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Education systems throughout the world have in place various forms of selection which, across the continuum of education, allocate places to students based on their performance in examinations. This is particularly true in the case of entry into higher education. However, in Northern Ireland, selection based on academic performance starts at a much younger age, whereby students are allocated places in selective grammar schools based on their performance in what is commonly referred to as the 11+ transfer test. However, with a significant research base to suggest the multiple disadvantages and unintended consequences of such a testing and sorting regime, the government put in place various mechanisms to end academic selection, with the last government-sponsored transfer test taking place in 2008.

For those unfamiliar with the complex wheels of policy implementation and enactment in Northern Ireland, it could be assumed that after decades of negotiating the end of the transfer test, attainment of a place in post-primary schools in Northern Ireland is now based on parental, student choice and, in the modern era, with equity and inclusion to the fore of evidence informed decision-making processes; enrolment criteria that is used in most education systems, such as the age of the student and their proximity to the school.

However, the cessation of government-sponsored transfer tests was considered by certain architects of policy and practice and a proportion of grammar schools as a retrograde step that could potentially reduce the overall quality of education and social mobility of students in Northern Ireland. It has also been suggested that, despite the fact that grammar schools are embedded in legislation, removing academic selection would have the effect of ending the grammar school system. As such, in 2009, certain grammar schools that were opposed to the ending of academic selection set up their own testing system which, to this day, is used as a means of allocating places to students based on the test scores in these examinations.

The Department of Education recommended that admission to post-primary schools should not relate to academic ability and instead, the allocation of places should be based on, for example, named schools and those students who resided in the defined catchment area. The Department also recommended that primary schools should not in any way facilitate unregulated testing arrangements. However, in many respects, what was to emerge one year later highlights the importance of legislation and the fragility of policy recommendations more generally.

By way of explanation, in 2016, further guidance on the transfer test was yet again released by the Department of Education, which unhelpfully, in such a short time, contradicted previous recommendations. It was recommended that grammar schools could, if desired, use academic selection to allocate places. Furthermore, and to facilitate the continuity of such arrangements, primary schools could also supply support materials and prepare students for the tests during core teaching hours. With high praise for the continuation of academic selection, the Department of Education also highlighted that a significant benefit of academic selection is that it can enable social mobility.

As a result of certain grammar schools rejecting previous guidelines and the strong endorsement and favourable recommendations for the continuation of the transfer test, the popularity of these unregulated tests is such that approximately 50% of the entire population of primary P7 (11- to 12-year-old) students in Northern Ireland sit one or both tests.

Given the ever-changing policy narrative on academic selection that exists In Northern Ireland, the purpose of the research in Irish Studies in International Affairs (ARINS) was to deconstruct the advantages, disadvantages and unintended consequences of academic selection by combining interview data gathered from school leaders (in both the primary and post-primary sectors, from both selective grammar schools and non-selective secondary schools) in Northern Ireland, with that of the already extensive research base on academic selection and inequalities in education.

Evidence derived from this research suggests that, for those who are proponents of academic selection, the perceived benefits of gaining a place in selective grammar schools includes better overall performance in GCSE and A-level examinations, coupled with the fact that children from socio-economically deprived backgrounds can perform better than they would in comprehensive education; what in many respects could be referred to as the Peloton effect of academic selection. According to one selective grammar school principal:

The advantages are that you are taking children on a journey, and they are automatically—well, not automatically as we work very hard, and some of the children have huge socioeconomic issues, but because we have the ability of a greater chance of a child getting seven passes or five passes—they’re kind of ‘quid’s in’.

With no surprise, the perceived benefits of gaining a place in selective grammar schools was also strongly associated with enhanced academic and social status in communities.

As one non-grammar school principal stated:

I know from last year; we had a young child who was put into us, and then a couple of weeks later, he was offered a place in the grammar school. He was very, very happy. His father had commented on how happy he was, and yet his father decided to take up the place, and when I questioned him, he said it’s all about perception. ‘When you see two children walking down the school together, one in a secondary school uniform and one in a grammar school uniform, the neighbours will perceive and think that he is the smartest of the two’.

In her response to this paper, Joanne Hughes highlights the fact that:

Children (and indeed many parents) believe that a grammar school education is ‘superior’ and that at a young age, children in Northern Ireland have an acute sense that a good performance in the test and securing a grammar school place is a measure of worth, while not doing so represents failure.

By association with the preceding comments and in line with the extensive evidence base on academic selection, participants in this study also described the many disadvantages and unintended consequences of academic selection across the continuum of education. These multiple disadvantages included but were not limited to increased competition among schools, and aside from making schools ‘very competitive with each other for the wrong reasons’, the test itself was not regarded as being fair on children. Two primary school principals stated the following:

It’s not very nice, its completely unfair, focused very narrowly, completely unregulated. Now it’s more regulated than it used to be because enough years have gone past.

The test is skewed, the test is narrow and academic selection is not suited to all children.

The effects of such a testing and sorting regime was also perceived as having a significant effect on the health and wellbeing of students. As stated by one primary school principal:

Children view themselves as being a failure…and it’s the devastation to the children themselves who are waiving on a score, and that score defines them, and in one moment of opening an envelope, they are defined as a success or failure at the age of 10 or 11, and we have talked about that for many years.

What makes for very uncomfortable reading, another principal from a non-selective post-primary school also stated that:

I have about ten special needs children who are trying to get in with us, and those poor children have their own difficulties but imagine what that is doing to their mental health and not only that but what it’s doing to the family unit.

In response to this research, Tony Gallagher quite correctly and succinctly states that:

what they find is, in some respects, unremarkable: the selection system remains socially biased; it continues to distort the curriculum of primary schools; it leads to high variance in educational outcomes in the population; it encourages a narrow focus on qualifications as if this is the only important priority for education; and those who benefit it from the system want to retain it, while those who do not want to change it.

In conclusion, it is quite disconcerting and, in many respects, exasperating that research of this nature still has had to be carried out at all, given the overwhelming evidence in the existing body of research to suggest that the 11-plus transfer examination is damaging to: teaching and learning; the health and wellbeing of students and their families prior to and after the examination; equity and inclusion in education; the international profile of Northern Ireland’s education system; society at large.

There are far more prescient issues which those architects of policy and practice need to focus their influence and efforts on, such as, with evidence-informed policy and human and social capital to the fore, putting in place mechanisms to: enhance equity of participation in education for students from all cultural affiliations; enhance shared and community-based education; increasing the number of socio-economically deprived students continuing their studies at the further or higher education level.

These efforts should not include fuelling an outdated and divisive sorting and testing regime that, in many respects, takes the focus away from an education system that is internationally renowned for (regardless of the school type) the quality of teaching and leadership together with advances in shared education, digital education, school evaluation, to name but a few examples.

Read the full article by Martin Brown and colleagues, ‘The rise and fall and rise of academic selection’, as well as the responses to the article by Professors Tony Gallagher and Joanne Hughes (Queen’s University) as they appear in our journal Irish Studies in International Affairs: ARINS.

Discussions about constitutional change on the island of Ireland have advanced significantly. The scale of ongoing work in civil society, political parties and universities is impressive. That is not to neglect what went before; many have been pressing the case for decades. For those who seek a united Ireland, this is merely the latest phase in a long journey, a time when the preferred end goal seems to be in sight.

Political unionism appears to be in denial, casting doubt on the extent of the debate, its appropriateness, and the evidential basis for it. Brexit is playing a lead role in altering the mood, for reasons that have been exhaustively rehearsed and are not hard to decipher. Northern Ireland has been removed from the EU; an automatic return option stands ready to be operationalised. While much attention will be on what a united Ireland looks like, there should be just as much interest in what happens before the vote. How will the anticipated referendums work? Will it be possible to test democratic consent in a way that is perceived as legitimate and fair? How do you guarantee that the Good Friday Agreement is respected and that a good faith reading prevails? By way of answering these questions, let us draw out a number of core themes.

First, this may appear surprising given the volume of work, but there is still room for normalising the discussion. That task has become easier, as more people, including prominent figures – such as the Tánaiste Leo Varadkar – openly enter the field. Those engaging in the public debate without something useful to say seem out of place. The narrative framing around planning and preparation assists; it is hard to argue against responsible management of an agreed process. It is a space that political and civic actors now feel confident, for a variety of reasons, to venture into. As the work noted above proliferates, the next challenge will be encouraging people to engage with each other in a productive and coordinated way, for the purpose of ensuring that coherent propositions emerge. That may prove difficult, as tensions on both sides of the argument begin to manifest themselves. Agreeing on a constitutional objective tells us little about what is substantively envisaged, for the Union or for a united Ireland. Few seem immune from the temptation to settle political scores and the next phase may be hazardous.

Second, the existing framework must be further clarified, and a sufficient consensus achieved around how it will operate. Both governments have a particular role, with others, and the more that can be agreed in advance the better. As argued in my article in Irish Studies in International Affairs, the British government cannot, if it is to comply with the Agreement, withhold relevant information. The obligation of ‘rigorous impartiality’ requires honesty about how any transition will be managed. Attempts must be made to incentivise inclusive and meaningful dialogue before the referendums take place. In particular, care should be taken to avoid a framing that would privilege post hoc and exclusively elite-level political negotiations or suggest that there is a communal veto over progress. In order to avoid that it would be helpful if the parameters were discussed and articulated in an agreed form soon. Many of these matters can be resolved now, and there is some clarity around how, for example, the outcome will be measured and the choices on offer made. Given the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, it is unlikely that any purely internal way forward within the UK will secure the required levels of trust, so international experience and oversight may be helpful.

Third, the task of setting out the deliverable proposals for a united Ireland will, in the end, fall to an Irish government. That must come after a period of wide and deep civic engagement and political reflection. What follows the referendums, if there are votes for change, will be a process of implementing known proposals. While there will be intergovernmental negotiation, on a rolling basis, and that can be imaginatively conceived, much of the post-referendum politics must be around practical implementation. The argument advanced in my article about the urgent need for preparation therefore aligns with those calling for extensive planning. The objective is not to impede progress – I have also argued for a time frame to be put in place – but to ensure a proper understanding of the consequences of a vote either way.

Finally, the article makes the case throughout for an all-island approach. Yes, there is a need to recognise the distinctive nature of the two jurisdictions on the island, and relationships across these islands, but the right of self-determination belongs to the people of the island of Ireland and the outcome will be decided on the basis of their concurrent consent. The rationale and logic behind this must be respected at every stage. An approach that further privileges a separate and detached Northern Ireland dimension would be a mistake and contrary to any reasonable, good faith and contextual reading of this Agreement right. In my view, that means simultaneous referendums based on clarity about what is on offer, preceded by an all-island process of informed and honest civic and political dialogue. This will need to be robust enough to withstand the pressure that will come and, as noted, mechanisms to provide international oversight may assist.

Although the constitutional debate is complex, a simple idea remains at its core. If the status of Northern Ireland does rest on consent, and if the right belongs to the people of the island without ‘external impediment’, then it is only fair to offer a democratic choice in the way, and in the circumstances, anticipated in the Agreement. That day may arrive sooner than many realise.

Read the full article by Colin Harvey, ‘Let “the People” Decide: Reflections on Constitutional Change and “Concurrent Consent”’, as it appears in our journal Irish Studies in International Affairs: ARINS.

Her article outlining the work and findings has been peer reviewed and will shortly be published in Irish Studies in International Affairs along with other ARINS work. You can read the paper ‘Collaborating on Healthcare on an All-Island Basis: A Scoping Study’ here in advance of publication.

This independent scoping research was commissioned by the Shared Island unit in the Department of the Taoiseach as a discussion paper contribution for a Shared Island Dialogue event on ‘Working together for a healthier island’, on 8th July 2021, held as part of the Government of Ireland’s Shared Island initiative. Recordings and reports of the Shared Island Dialogue series are available at www.gov.ie/SharedIsland/Dialogues.

Professor Deirdre Heenan was formerly Provost and Dean of Academic Development at the Magee Campus. A distinguished researcher, author and broadcaster, she is a member of the Institute for Research in Social Sciences and has published widely on healthcare, education policy, social care and devolution. She is a co-founder and former co-director of the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey. Her previous article ‘Cross-border co-operation Health in Ireland’ is freely available in Irish Studies in International Affairs.

Negotiating a post-Brexit settlement between the UK and EU continues in a tense and evolving political arena. This is particularly true in respect of Northern Ireland, as disagreement on the mechanisms needed to facilitate an ongoing movement and trade settlement has caused civil and political discontent; and the threat of a hard border being re-introduced lingers. Similarly, some scholars and political activists have argued that the UK’s exit from the EU has expedited the impetus for a border poll on the island, with greater legitimacy being attributed to calls for full constitutional reunification.

But one area that remains under-explored is the issue of social welfare provision, and what it will look like in both jurisdictions in the coming years. This not only pertains to debates surrounding reunification, but also to maintaining the current coordination arrangements in place by virtue of the Common Travel Area (CTA) that exists between both states.

Common Drivers, Different Tracks

Both the Irish and UK welfare states can be classified as liberal welfare states. This is due to their emphasis on employment, and drive to provide minimum subsistence payments where applicants have not made adequate national insurance contributions. It is also true that due to its colonial history, Ireland places similar divisions between contributory benefits and means-tested benefits. However, this surface-level comparison of both systems is unhelpful for many reasons, particularly alongside the interaction of different healthcare systems that either absorb or generate additional costs for claimants. We argue that a ‘first-principles’ approach is more appropriate in beginning to envisage what a new welfare settlement could look like.

The two states began to ideologically diverge with the Thatcher government in the 1980s, which sought to erode social solidarity, cut the generosity of payments, increase means-testing and engage in ‘activation’ policies that sought to make payments more conditional upon engagement with the labour market. These policies, underpinned by ‘welfare conditionality’, continued through the Major and then Blair governments, before the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition government engaged with great enthusiasm in austerity politics, seeking to cut social security entitlements significantly, as well as creating a ‘hostile environment’ for migrants and limiting their recourse to social welfare funds. The picture is further complicated by devolution in Northern Ireland, which does have an explicit competence in respect of social security but has often failed to significantly diverge from the Westminster government due to budgetary constraints.

Despite the UK’s more intense embrace of public spending reductions, we identified three common drivers in the development of the contemporary welfare state in both jurisdictions: activation; austerity and xenophobia. All three of these drivers can also be seen in the retrenchment of the Irish welfare state, albeit at different times and to varying extents. Xenophobia was seen in the late 1990s following Ireland’s first significant experience of inward migration, and by creating the parallel system of welfare provision for asylum seekers, Direct Provision. Both activation and austerity would not become sustained features of the Irish system until the late 2000s until the bailout package introduced following the global financial crisis. Overall, it is argued that both welfare states have a shared downward trajectory within levels of material social supports granted, particularly in the last twenty five years.

Shared Future

The ideological commonalities, coupled with the practical distinctions, pose significant questions regarding the shared future of welfare provision on the island. EU law has played a significant role in supporting welfare coordination for cross-border workers, and still significant gaps remain in this area. Therefore, it has been argued that a new Treaty should be created between North and South to facilitate greater coordination and guarantee protections. However, the viability of this approach remains questionable given the ‘success’ of previous attempts (or lack thereof) in the area.

We argue that due to the sustained downward trajectory of both states in respect of social welfare provision, and exacerbated by the pandemic, there is a pressing need to push for radical, rights-based change to current welfare state structures across the island. This necessitates integrating discussions on social welfare provision into all debates on all-island coordination, with input from stakeholders. This is due to a fundamental concern that attempting to purely harmonise access might provide an opportunity for political actors to further erode the current levels of social welfare provision in both jurisdictions.

This conversation becomes crucial in respect of any future settlement that might result from reunification. Amalgamating two different systems would mean choosing a single vision for what welfare provision would be. That could mean choosing the lowest level of provision available for a particular payment, or the most conditional, thus solidifying a ‘new Ireland’s’ liberal approach. On the other hand, preparation for a new constitutional settlement presents an opportunity to vividly reimagine a welfare state that reflects the needs and ambitions of a modern and forward-thinking Ireland.

It is imperative that these difficult questions are posed now, and that public debate considers what a progressive shared future can and should look like based on strong evidence and the lived experiences of those who have; and continue to be supported by the welfare state.

Read the full article by Ciara Fitzpatrick and Charles O’Sullivan, ‘Comparing Social Security Provision North and South of Ireland: Past Developments and Future Challenges’, as it appears in our journal Irish Studies in International Affairs: ARINS.

Recent years have witnessed a growing chorus of calls for a citizens’ assembly in Northern Ireland. There are groups dedicated to lobbying for an all-island citizens’ assembly in advance of a future referendum, while an all-island citizens’ assembly is also mentioned in official Sinn Féin policy documents. Others are less specific, but for example, the British and Irish government’s 2020 New Decade, New Approach document proposed that one citizens’ assembly be held per year. However, it is notable that such proposals have not been welcomed by any of the unionist parties and indeed part of the reason for the collapse of the Civic Forum in 2002 was the DUP’s belief that it did not contain sufficient numbers of anti-Good Friday Agreement opinion.

And so we must remain cautious—citizens’ assemblies or other deliberative methods are no panacea. There are risks as well as opportunities; these are heightened in a divided society and heightened further when the political issue at stake is one of identity. There is some hope that the deliberative systems’ turn in democratic theory may provide some answers. This may be achieved through creating new, parallel institutions to inject more deliberation into the system, both through separate deliberative institutions and a focus on social practices underpinning deliberation within society. These deliberative processes and systems have particular strengths when tied to collective decision-making mechanisms such as referendums, strengthening the connection and legitimacy between the relatively small numbers within the deliberative institution and the wider maxi-public looking on.

The perceived advantages of such deliberative scrutiny are potentially multifaceted, including helping to counter elite manipulation; facilitating perspective taking and empathy building, and increasing reflection; delivering systematic improvements in democratic outcomes such as alignment between values and votes, i.e. correct voting; and reducing polarisation. However, we should also recall that a direct connection to a referendum increases the salience of the deliberation and in a divided society this can be problematic.

Further, good deliberation takes planning. There are a number of essential components and civility norms. There is also rather less experience to date of deliberation in deeply divided societies. Indeed, there are those who warn that it is simply not possible in deeply segmented or polarised societies, and that it could backfire and inflame sectarian political conflict.

In order to consider whether these challenges can be overcome, we need to consider whether the circumstances of Northern Ireland fit the meta-requirements of deliberation and how the requirements of deliberative systems can be adapted to local circumstances and culture. Inclusion essentially implies that any decision-making process must include, on equal terms, all those subject to its decisions. Moderation says if we enter such a process we must be prepared to moderate our claims in the face of the opposing views of our fellow participants. These are very difficult conditions to meet when deliberating in a deeply divided society.

The way forward is likely to conceive of the public sphere in Northern Ireland as part of a deliberative system rather than envisaging a single contested deliberative assembly preceding a poll on the future of the polity. A possible approach could be to emulate the Ostbelgien or East Belgium with an overarching Northern Ireland-only forum that can hold various local citizens’ assemblies and juries with topics decided in a bottom-up manner. The initial topics must be cross-cutting, and must be about improving the lives of all citizens and thus provide evidence to all that the process can work and can be trusted. This was the modus operandi of the first Constitutional Convention in the republic, which considered issues such as the length of the presidential term and a reduction in the voting age in its first weeks before moving on to the more polarising topic of marriage equality. In a forthcoming article in the current ARINS series, I present a modest proposal for building a deliberative system in Northern Ireland which could help work towards both inclusion and moderation, should an assembly become possible in advance of a future referendum.

Read the full article by Jane Suiter, A Modest Proposal: Building a Deliberative System in Northern Ireland, as it appears in our journal Irish Studies in International Affairs: ARINS.